Value Lens has two kinds of input. The per-deal inputs are the levers you set fresh for each opportunity, the things the room debates. The constitution variables are the company assumptions that stay fixed (set once, reviewed quarterly). This page explains every per-deal input in plain language: what it is, why it matters, and the mistake to avoid. The constitution variables are summarized at the bottom, with full detail and sources in the Constitution.
The genuinely new revenue at normal run-rate, net of anything you'd have won anyway, or that cannibalizes your own higher-margin business. This is the top of the funnel and the "growth" pillar on the radar. Pitfall: counting revenue that just displaces your own better business.
What it is. A dropdown of the real customer book (Walmart, UNFI, KeHE, Amazon, Costco, Target, Dollar Tree, Kroger, Aldi, Co-Man, other) plus "New customer."
Why it matters. This is the engine of the concentration result. The tool holds every existing customer flat to the $100M exit, adds this deal's revenue to the account you pick, fills the rest with diversified growth, and reads the largest customer's exit share off the concentration curve. Piling onto your largest account deepens the discount; a new or small account keeps the largest near ~33% and holds the book at its baseline.
Pitfall. Forgetting that pouring enough revenue into any single account eventually makes that account the concentration problem: the model will show it the moment it happens.
Which book the earnings land in: classify by where the earnings sit, not where the activity happens. This connects the deal to the "multiple" pillar and to the mix-shift effect on the whole book. Pitfall: treating a PL or co-man win as equivalent to branded growth because the revenue line looks the same: it doesn't price the same.
What it is. Revenue minus variable costs (COGS, freight, ongoing trade spend): the honest incremental number a deal sponsor can actually estimate.
How the tool uses it. You give it contribution margin; the complexity and capacity inputs then carry the overhead haircut, and the tool computes the fully-loaded EBITDA margin from there. That keeps you honest about trade spend and freight without asking you to allocate overhead by hand.
Pitfall. Quoting gross margin and calling it contribution: trade spend and freight are real, and they have to be in.
Risk-adjusts EBITDA before any multiple, so a maybe can't borrow a yes's valuation. Think in 25-point bands (50 / 75 / 90 / 100). Pitfall: defaulting everything to ~100%.
What it is. How much the deal fits your core versus fragments it: in-core / moderate / high.
What it does. It scales the overhead the deal pulls in (in-core 0.85 · moderate 1.0 · high 1.25), so complexity costs earnings and margin and pushes the deal to the right on the effort axis of the matrix. The multiple is left to concentration and mix. Complexity doesn't touch it.
Pitfall. Rating everything "in-core" to dodge the load.
What it is. A Low / Medium / High read on the finite capacity and management bandwidth the deal eats.
What it does. It folds into the overhead bridge (low 0.90 · medium 1.0 · high 1.15), so "is the plant really free?" shows up in the margin. Pitfall: assuming spare capacity is free capacity.
What it is. Whether the revenue is everyday-embedded, recurring-seasonal, or a one-time LTO: the quality of the revenue, separate from which vertical it sits in.
What it does (two effects). (A) Revenue quality: it adjusts the deal's own earnings by a few turns: everyday-embedded +0.4x (sticky revenue a buyer doesn't have to re-earn), recurring 0.0x (neutral), one-shot −0.5x (project revenue a buyer marks down). (B) Concentration likelihood, not severity: it softens only the concentration the deal adds (everyday ×0.85 · recurring ×0.95 · one-shot ×1.00), because durable revenue makes the concentrated customer less likely to leave. It can never relax the 40% salability gate, which reads the raw exit share. Exact magnitudes are in the Constitution.
Pitfall. Calling a promotional or seasonal LTO "everyday" to grab the bonus. Durability is a judgment about whether the revenue actually recurs, not a wish. And remember: durability can soften a concentrating deal's discount, but it can't save it from the cliff.
When the deal reaches proven run-rate. Past month 18 (the 24-month horizon minus a 6-month buffer) it trips the maturity gate. Pitfall: optimistic ramps that quietly cross the deadline.
These are the fixed company assumptions every deal scores against. Full detail and sources are in the Constitution; in brief, they are: the three vertical anchor multiples (the spine), the concentration → discount curve, the gate lines (40% concentration, 5% margin floor, 18-month maturity), exit EBITDA ($15M, a stretch target), target revenue ($100M), the overhead base and factors, the durability adjustments and concentration softeners, and the radar display scales. All but the exit targets are editable live in the tool's Constitution panel; target revenue and exit EBITDA are fixed in this version, so every deal scores on the same ruler, with dynamic exit targets planned for later. Because everything is scored against the same $100M target, moving a dial changes the magnitudes, rarely the verdicts.
For a single deal: fully-loaded margin = contribution margin − (25% × complexity × capacity), then risk-adjusted EBITDA = revenue × margin × probability. That earnings figure drops into the chosen vertical to re-blend the book's multiple (nudged by durability, Effect A), and onto the chosen customer to re-read the concentration discount (softened by durability on the concentration the deal adds, Effect B), both measured at the $100M exit. The deal's score is the change in exit enterprise value versus the diversified growth it displaces. The per-deal inputs are the levers in the room; the constitution variables are the frame they move against.